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Changes in financial regulations, markets, and institu- 
tions  have been altering the relationships between key 
interest rates and the effective degree of stimulus or 
restraint in sectors of the economy. Although the com- 
plexity of these developments has made them difficult 
to monitor, statistical evidence relevant to the topic is 
becoming available. This article reviews a number of 
recent studies that directly or indirectly consider the 
influence of financial changes on the behavior of inter- 
est rates and the transmission of monetary policy. 
Before surveying the empirical evidence, it is useful 
to describe at a conceptual level how financial changes 
might affect interest rates and the transmission of pol- 
icy.  In principle, changes to the financial system may 
alter both the equilibrium level of interest rates—that 
is, the level consistent with a full employment noninfla- 
tionary  economy—and the  size of interest  rate 
changes consistent with the maintenance of good eco- 
nomic performance in the face of shocks to output and 
prices. If "nonprice" mechanisms that rationed credit in 
the past have been reduced, then more of the burden 
of credit allocation among potential borrowers will fall 
on interest rates. Without a perfectly elastic supply of 
savings  at given interest rates,  or any increase  for 
other reasons in the amount of loanable funds avail- 
able, the equilibrium level of rates will be higher. More- 
over,  if it is true that  in the past the nonprice 
mechanisms tended to bind especially forcefully when 
interest rates were high and less so when rates were 
lower, then once these mechanisms have ceased to 
operate, interest rates may have to rise and fall more 
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to exert the same restraining or stimulating effects on 
the economy. 
The core notion that allocational mechanisms other 
than explicit interest rates figure importantly in credit 
markets and affect the way monetary policy is transmit- 
ted is fairly  widely accepted in the economics literature 
(for example, Brunner and Meltzer 1988, Blinder  and 
Stiglitz 1983,  and Bernanke and Blinder 19881). Nev- 
ertheless, these mechanisms are not explicitly incorpo- 
rated in  some of the most widely used  economic 
models.  A stylized  neoclassical framework might 
emphasize individuals' or firms' saving and borrowing 
decisions that depend on interest rates, with borrowing 
and spending negatively related to interest rate levels 
except in cases  where offsetting income or wealth 
effects arising from interest rate movements are pre- 
sent. Such a framework does not recognize that bor- 
rowing is often constrained by other factors, and the 
resulting "notional"  demands for borrowing and spend- 
ing—that is,  the amounts individuals  or firms would 
ideally choose at given interest rates  — may not be an 
adequate description. 
Two important categories of constraints on borrowing 
activity will be cited in the discussion that follows. One 
type of constraint reflects the possible inability of  credit 
intermediaries to provide all the funds their loan cus- 
tomers demand. An example of such a "funding  avail- 
ability constraint" was the episodic  inability of 
iFull bibliographical information  for all sources cited in the text can 
be found in the reference list at  the end of the article. depository institutions to bid for deposits because of 
regulatory ceilings on deposit rates. To the extent that 
potential  borrowers depended  upon particular inter- 
mediaries or classes of intermediaries that  were unable 
to supply all the funds demanded, borrowing  — and 
spending—fell  short of the "notional" amounts that 
would otherwise have occurred at given interest rates. 
A second type of constraint might be called a "credit 
qualification constraint." Because of informational 
asymmetries, differing  assessments of the  underlying 
risks, or merely different attitudes toward those risks, a 
borrower may want to borrow more at the prevailing 
interest rate than a lender feels it can safely lend to 
that firm or individual. 
Structural changes in financial markets and practices 
over the past few decades have encouraged reductions 
in these financing constraints and  thereby raised 
potential  borrowers' abilities to realize their notional 
demands for credit.  Deposit rate ceilings have been 
eliminated,  relaxing funding  availability constraints 
since the 1970s and the early 1980s.  The entry of for- 
eign banks,  the phasing  out of interstate banking 
restrictions, the growth of commercial paper and other 
alternatives to loans, and the increased competition 
between depository and  nondepository intermediaries 
have increased potential borrowers' choice of lenders.2 
These developments  have reduced the likelihood that a 
borrower will be limited by an intermediary's own par- 
ticular funding situation or credit evaluation process. 
The growth in committed bank lines of credit has made 
it less likely that difficulties or delays in borrowing will 
force a business to limit its productive.activity. Securi- 
tization of assets  has provided  an  important  added 
dimension of funding flexibility  for intermediaries, 
including those with limited scope for raising deposits 
or other liabilities.3 Like the removal of deposit rate 
ceilings,  mortgage securitization has  helped to elimi- 
nate  funding  availability bottlenecks  in  the housing 
market. Similarly, the growth and spread of consumer 
credit lines, including those backed by home equity, 
have reduced the likelihood that  households will 
become constrained in their spending by slowness or 
difficulties in obtaining credit.4 
Thus some borrowers can borrow more than before, 
and —  for given interest rates and holding other factors 
equal  — aggregate spending on goods and services is 
20n foreign bank competition, commercial paper,  and competition  with 
nonbank competitors,  see Estrella (1986): Rook  and Alvarez (1986): 
and Mead and 0Neil  (1986). on interstate banking, see King, 
Tschinkel,  and Whitehead  (1989). 
3For a review of economic factors driving securitization of assets, see 
Cumming  (1987). 
tmFor a general description of consumer credit lines backed by home 
equity,  see Canner. Fergus, and Luckett (1988). 
stronger than it would have been in the absence of the 
financial changes. But because the overall productive 
capacity of an  economy is limited and the supply of 
savings, domestic or international, is not perfectly elas- 
tic, the equilibrium level of interest rates is higher fol- 
lowing the relaxation of the constraints. 
In addition, the sensitivity of aggregate demand to 
changes in interest rates may have been altered. That 
is, the financial changes may have  increased or 
decreased the size of movements in interest rates con- 
sistent with maintaining or restoring a noninflationary 
economic growth path. Many of the financial changes 
work in the direction of increasing the size of swings in 
interest  rates needed to achieve a given  impact on 
aggregate demand. The nature of funding availability 
and credit qualification  constraints suggests that the 
degree to which they bind may vary somewhat  system- 
atically with the level of interest rates. When deposit 
ceilings were in effect, they tended to bind more when 
interest  rates rose  and to ease up when  rates fell. 
Credit standards  automatically tighten  when interest 
rates rise, most obviously because debt service rises 
relative to current income but also because the resale 
value of collateral  assets drops  and expectations  of 
future earnings or cash flows may be revised down- 
ward. Financial changes that reduce the likelihood that 
such constraints bind as interest rates rise (and ease 
up as rates fall) will tend to increase the size of inter- 
est  rate  movements relative  to their effects on 
expenditures. 
Other financial changes, however,  may make expen- 
ditures more, rather than less, sensitive to interest rate 
movements. One very important example is the 1980s 
increase in the level of debt in the household and cor- 
porate sectors, itself a medium-term cumulative result 
of the relaxation of constraints on borrowing. Leverag- 
ing leaves borrowers' ability to obtain additional credit 
more sensitive to interest rates and credit market con- 
ditions  generally. Another  financial  change that may 
increase  potential borrowers'  sensitivity to interest 
rates is the trend toward pricing credit more directly 
and competitively off of short-term market  interest 
rates.  While  this trend is part of a broader set of 
changes making credit more widely available, floating 
rate loan pricing may affect borrowers' decisions more 
directly, possibly replacing credit rationing with a 
heightened interest rate sensitivity on the part of bor- 
rowers themselves.  Thus the ability of monetary policy 
to affect certain types of borrowers through short-term 
market rates may be enhanced. Finally, categories of 
borrowers who were previously at the margin of mar- 
kets for credit may now have more access. Some of 
these people and businesses may now rely more on 
debt than in the past and may therefore be more sensi- 
FRBNY Quarterly Review/Summer  1990  9 tive to changes in credit market conditions. 
Exchange rates also may be affected by reductio;is 
in nonprice credit rationing mechanisms. If the decline 
of such mechanisms leads to an increase in the 
domestic effective demand for credit, not only will inter- 
est rates increase but also the exchange value of the 
domestic  currency will rise.  In turn, imports  will be 
encouraged  and exports  discouraged. Such  an  out- 
come presumes that parallel changes in other econ- 
omies' financial systems do not lead to equally higher 
foreign interest rate levels, which would offset effects 
on exchange rates and require domestic interest rates 
to rise still more. More generally, domestic  financial 
sector improvements  that attract  capital from abroad in 
one period might be imitated in foreign economies in 
subsequent periods. As financial changes that draw in 
capital  and encourage spending and imports  in one 
economy  eventually make themselves felt  in  other 
economies, balances of trade will shift as well. 
In addition to influencing the general levels of 
exchange rates, financial changes may also affect the 
size of swings  in  exchange rates through  time.  As 
noted, a country's own interest rates may be induced to 
rise or fall to a greater or smaller degree as a result of 
financial  changes.  Exchange  rate movements might 
then tend to become correspondingly more or less vol- 
atile, reflecting  the domestic  interest  rate changes, 
other factors equal. 
Financial  changes that  affect the relationship 
between interest rates and economic activity  also may 
have implications for monetary policy. At least tempo- 
rarily, the monetary authorities can  influence interest 
rates by adjusting  the  availability of bank  reserves. 
However, if they were to attempt to hold down the level 
of interest rates  artificially by supplying excessive 
reserves when macroeconomic equilibrium  implied a 
higher interest rate level, then the result would be too 
rapid a growth of credit and an acceleration of inflation. 
More generally, if the authorities attempted to keep 
interest rates from changing appropriately in response 
to shifting macroeconomic forces, the result would be 
less economic stability. 
To summarize the conceptual framework, financial 
changes that reduce constraints on funding availability 
or on credit qualification allow some businesses and 
households  to spend at higher levels more closely 
approximating  their  ideal, notional demands.  Such 
changes  strengthen aggregate  demand,  pushing  up 
interest rates and attracting foreign capital. To the 
extent that the lifting of financial constraints changes 
the  sensitivity  of aggregate  demand components to 
movements in  interest  rates, the  size of the  interest 
rate responses to given demand shocks changes as 
well. Some developments may have made the marginal 
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effect of rate changes on spending smaller, but there 
have also been  some offsetting  increases  in sensi- 
tivities to interest rate changes. 
Evidence of the effects of fInancial  change 
This section reviews evidence of shifts in funding avail- 
ability and  credit qualification constraints on inter- 
mediation and borrowing.  Central questions are 
whether financial changes  have raised the level of 
interest  rates consistent  with noninflationary  growth 
and whether a given fluctuation in aggregate demand 
now requires a different sized adjustment in rates than 
in the past to maintain  macroeconomic equilibrium. 
This section also considers how the relative incidence 
of interest rate sensitivities may have shifted, among 
domestic sectors as well as external  trade-sensitive 
sectors. 
At the outset, it is useful to review some basic trends 
in  interest and exchange rates. From a long-run per- 
spective, interest  rates have tended to be higher in 
recent years than in earlier decades. Table 1  shows 
average levels of short- and  long-term interest rates 
over a series of five-year periods from 1955 to 1989. If 
one abstracts from the  inflationary early 1980s,  both 
short- and long-term rates show upward secular trends. 
Table  1  also shows the rates as "real rates," adjusted 
for inflation, and these too have been higher on aver- 
age during the economic expansion of the 1980s. 
Table 2 measures the average size of interest rate 
swings, calculated here as absolute values of Decem- 
ber-to-December  rate changes, averaged  over five-year 
periods. It is not as clear from these volatility-type cal- 
culations whether interest rate changes have become 
1955-59  3.49  2.54  1.84  .89 
1960-64  4.01  2.91  2.76  1.66 
1965-69  5.37  5.54  1.95  2.13 
1970-74  6.81  7.07  .68  .94 
1975-79  8.23  7.22  .18  —.83 
1980-84  12.39  12.17  4.88  4.66 
1985-89  8.75  7.67  5.08  4.00 
— 
Table  1 
Average Nominal and Real U.S. Interest Rates 
Real  Real 
Long-Termt  Short-Termt Long-Terms  Short-Termil 
Period-average ten-year  Treasury. 
*Period-average  federal funds rate. 
§Period-average  ten-year Treasury bond yield minus 
contemporaneous  period-average  consumer price index (CPI) 
inflation rate. 
federal funds rate minus the contemporaneous 
period-average  CPI inflation rate. Table 2 
Average Absolute Changes  in Nominal and 
Real U.S. Interest Rates 
(In Basis Points) 
Real  Real 
Long-Termt  Short-Term* Long-Terms  Short-Terms 
59  77  126  115 
32  77  67  87 
69  138  72  80 
64  241  214  237 
104  260  224  102 
163  334  230  254 
153  78  112  150 
Note: Table shows  five-year averages of absolute values of 
annual December-to-December  rate changes. 
tTen-year Treasury  bond yield. 
Federal funds rate. 
§Ten-year  Treasury bond yield minus the  twelve-month  lagged 
CPI inflation  rate. 
IlFederal  funds rate minus the twelve-month  lagged CPI inflation 
rate. 
systematically larger or smaller in recent years.5 The 
changes in long-term real and nominal rates have been 
larger since the  mid-1970s, but  not especially  larger 
since the mid-1980s. The two  measures of average 
short-term rate movements, on the other hand, were 
moderate during the late 1980s, in the context of rela- 
tively stable macroeconomic  conditions. 
Chart  1  plots the differential between U.S. and for- 
eign long-term interest rates against the weighted aver- 
age exchange rate, adjusting both interest rates and 
exchange rates for price-level changes. The trend from 
the mid-1970s  through the Iate'1980s was for U.S. real 
rates to rise relative to foreign real rates. The real dol- 
lar's strength in the first half of the 1980s and its drop 
in  1985-86 appear partly attributable  to the interest 
rate  differential. As Chart 2 shows, changes in the dol- 
lar were relatively large in  much of the  1980s,  even 
compared with the changes during the earlier floating 
rate period of the 1970s. 
To check robustness with respect to different choices of volatility 
measures,  monthly  and quarterly standard deviations of short- and 
long-term nominal and real interest rates were also  computed, and 
the  pattern was similar to  that in Table 2. 
Long-Term Real Interest Rate DifferentIal and Real Dollar  Exchange Rates 
"Foreign Major  Five"  Countries 
Percent  Dollar  index 
180 
.61111 
I Ill  I Ill  I  II  I 
1970  71  72  73 
11111111111111111111111111111111  IHI 11111111 
74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84 
Ill  I Ill I Ill  1111 III I  160 
85  86  87  88  89 
Notes:  Foreign major  five  countries are  Japan,  Germany, the  United Kingdom, France, and  Canada. Weighted  real dollar  index  is  calculated using 
each country's  GNP and GNP  deflator  relative to  the U.S.  GNP  deflator.  Long-term rates  are  calculated by  subtracting inflation  (four-quarter 
lags)  from each country's  nominal Interest rate.  The long-term Interest rates  used are  from long-term industrial bonds  (Japan), Industrial 
bonds  (Germany), twenty-year  debentures (United Kingdom), public  bonds  (France). and industrial bonds  (Canada).  The  AAA  corporate  bond 
rate is used  for  the United  States. 
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100 The  following subsections review the evidence on the 
effects of financial change on different parts of  the U.S. 
economy, particularly such traditionally interest-sensi- 
tive areas  as housing,  consumer durables expendi- 
tures,  and business  investment. The possibility that 
exchange rates and international financial market link- 
ages are assuming greater importance in the transmis- 
sion of monetary policy is also discussed. In addition, 
attention is given to aggregate-level research that may 
clarify whether the financial  changes  are significant 
from a macroeconomic perspective. 
Housing and mortgage markets 
Many  analysts agree that financial changes have 
altered the relationships  between  interest  rates  and 
mortgage and homebuilding activity. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, tight monetary policy on several occasions 
slowed housing by pushing interest rates on short-term 
instruments such as Treasury bills  above the maximum 
rate allowed under Regulation Q at depository institu- 
tions. As depositors withdrew funds to seek  higher mar- 
ket  rates — a  phenomenon  known as "disinter- 
Chart  2 
mediation"  — many thrifts were unable to originate new 
loans.6 
Econometric studies confirm that  deposit deregula- 
tion increased the availability of funding for housing. 
Jaffee and Rosen (1979) estimate a model of the hous- 
ing sector through the end  of 1978,  when deposit 
deregulation was just getting  underway in the  United 
States. Simulating forward, they find that the post-1978 
growth of money market certificates kept housing starts 
higher than otherwise in the face of sharp interest rate 
increases. Throop (1986) presents evidence that the 
severe funding availability constraints under Regulation 
Q reduced residential construction by up to 12 percent 
in some quarters and that such effects have now been 
eliminated. Throop further calculates that financial 
deregulation  since the mid-1970s increased the vari- 
ability of interest  rates,  although  only to a modest 
.degree. Friedman  (1989), using large  econometric 
model estimates, finds that mortgage rates would have 
eFor  further discussion of  disintermediation  effects on housing, see 
the article by John Ryding in this issue of the Quarterly  Review. 
Change In  the Value of the U.S. Dollar 
December-to-December  Percent  Changes 
Notes: The  value  of  the U.S.  dollar is  measured as a  trade-weighted  rate  of  exchange against  ten  foreign  currencies.  Weights reflect  1972-76 global 
trade of each of the Group  of  Ten  countries. 
*  1990  value  is  August-to-August  change. 
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an impact on housing equivalent to that caused by a 
decline in  mortgage funding  availability typical of 
severe disintermediation episodes. Ryding (1990) pre- 
sents econometric evidence that even the limited disin- 
termediation taking place in the early 1980s  dampened 
housing activity, although this effect was clearly  less 
pronounced than  in earlier periods  because deposit 
ceilings were being  phased out. Presumably by the 
middle 1980s the completion of the Regulation Q ceil- 
ing phaseout, together with the  growth of secondary 
mortgage trading, had eliminated this type of disinter- 
mediation effect from the monetary transmission 
mechanism. 
Ryding also offers evidence that the growth of sec- 
ondary mortgage trading has affected the cost of hous- 
ing finance.  In the mid-1980s the sharp  rise in the 
proportion of outstanding single-family mortgages trad- 
ing  in  securitized form helped to break the links 
between particular institutions'  ability to attract 
deposits and  individual  households' ability to obtain 
mortgage credit. In addition, the increased competition 
among originators and among investors in mortgages 
implied by the secondary market growth, together with 
the credit enhancement provided by federally spon- 
sored mortgage-backed securities programs, suggests 
lower all-in funding costs to homebuyers; Ryding shows 
that lending spreads have indeed been narrower as a 
result. 
In principle, increased mortgage lending competition 
may also make it easier for some borrowers to qualify 
for loans because there are more lenders seeking to 
identify acceptable  credits.  Also contributing to this 
increased flexibility in qualifying borrowers for mort- 
gage credit is a series of innovations stimulated  by 
lenders' attempts to accommodate the effects of infla- 
tion  on cash flows. While  high nominal interest rates 
reflect expectations  of general  price and  wage 
increases, lending decisions out of prudence must give 
less than full •weight to such projected inflation. Jaffee 
and Rosen model the demand for housing as depend- 
ing in part on nominal, rather than only on real, interest 
rate levels. New types  of mortgages reducing cash  flow 
requirements and increasing credit qualification began 
to be used with the arrival of very high nominal interest 
rates in the early 1980s.7  In addition, some mortgage 
lenders eased their limits on acceptable levels of debt 
service relative to income.8 With lower inflation, some 
of these changes in lending standards may have been 
7For  example, see Jones (1982) and DeMagistris  (1982). 
8Wojnilower  (1985) notes that lenders became markedly enthusiastic 
(partly also for legal reasons) about taking households second 
incomes into account in credit evaluations.  See especially p. 354. 
reversed, but others persist. Adjustable rate  mortgages 
(ARMs), for example, developed in an inflationary envi- 
ronment but have continued to some extent even with 
lower rates. 
ARMs  are a particularly successful innovation 
because they help intermediaries better  manage 
repricing and prepayment risks, and they also tend to 
allow  lower monthly payments for borrowers. The  better 
risk-management opportunities  encourage intermedi- 
aries to extend  ARM credit, although variable pay- 
ments raise  credit risk for  marginal  borrowers. 
Borrowers too must balance  the lower starting pay- 
ments against the greater cash flow  uncertainty. 
Studies have tended to find that adjustable rate  lending 
has had a very modest positive impact on the effective 
demand for housing.9 
While ARMs probably make housing credit somewhat 
more available and affordable, they may also increase 
the sensitivity of housing to marginal changes in short- 
term rates, which in turn are most influenced by mone- 
tary policy. Ryding shows that, particularly in the last 
few years, the ARMs share of new mortgage origina- 
tions has fluctuated closely in line with the spread of 
fixed rates relative to the ARM rate.1° That is, people 
tend to take the lower rate,  If tight monetary  policy 
raises short-term  rates, some potential  home buyers 
could choose fixed rates instead of adjustable rates. 
But to the extent that there now exists a component of 
housing demand that is especially dependent upon the 
normally lower ARM  rates, a rise in short-term rates 
may have a direct negative impact on some home pur- 
chase decisions.11 
On balance,  it appears fairly  clear that housing 
finance is better insulated from periods of major credit 
stringency than in the past, mainly because of deposit 
deregulation but also because of the  growth of the sec- 
ondary mortgage market.  In addition, the market 
appears generally more competitive, providing credit- 
worthy borrowers better access. By contrast, it is not 
as clear how financial changes have affected sensitivity 
to less dramatic movements in interest rates. It seems 
at least  possible that ARMs may have created a slightly 
9For discussions of the theoretical issues and for empirical findings, 
see Brueckner and Follain (1988); Goodman (1985); Palash  and 
Stoddard (1985); Stutzer and Roberds (1988); Esaki and 
Wachtenheim  (1984-5). 
105ee the accompanying article by Ryding in this issue of the 
Quarterly Review.  A different viewpoint emphasizes  that having ARMs 
as an alternative to fixed rate lending may reduce some borrowers' 
sensitivity to long-term rates, because they can use the floating rate 
alternative if they believe market  interest rates will fall more rapidly 
than implied by  the rates on fixed rate mortgages. See  Bosworth 
(1989, pp. 80, 81). 
11For some evidence that ARMs borrowers  tend to be relatively illiquid, 
see Goodman, Luckett, and Wilcox (1988). 
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ations, but this last point is still conjectural. 
Consumer expenditures 
Relationships  between interest  rates and household 
consumption spending may have changed as well. Tra- 
ditionally, spending  on goods other than consumer 
durables has not been very  interest sensitive.'2 One 
reason  is that many households are  net lenders  of 
funds and receivers of interest income. For example, 
many elderly people are spending down their accumu- 
lated lifetime savings and could therefore spend more 
if interest rates were to rise, particularly now that small 
savings  accounts  pay variable market rates.13 This 
logic extends also to middle-aged people accumulating 
savings for retirement, especially if their liabilities are 
l2Aegarding  the relative interesl insensitivity of consumption  outlays, 
particularly purchases other than of durable goods, see Hall (1988) 
and Campbell and Mankiw (1989). 
130n the savings behavior of  the elderly, see Hurd (1987). 
Chart  3 
locked in at fixed (for example,  mortgage)  rates.14 
Goodman, Luckett, and Wilcox (1988),  however,  show 
that for some younger households, particularly those 
with ARM loans and relatively few liquid assets, higher 
rates would squeeze their cash flows and presumably 
force less spending. 
A recent article by Cantor (1989) investigates how 
the effects of interest rates on household cash flows 
changed  in the 1980s.  He takes into account the 
growth  since the 1970s of assets  linked to market 
rates, particularly in the wake of deposit deregulation, 
in addition to the growth of ARMs and other  liabilities. 
Cantor finds that, on balance, the  increases in rate- 
sensitive assets and liabilities have largely offset each 
other. Thus they have not caused major changes in the 
overall sensitivity of household cash flows to interest 
rates over the last decade,  although some modest 
'4The logic here is analogous  to the result that higher interest rates 
increase the net asset value of pension funds, even those invested in 
fixed-rale assets, because their retirement funding goals or 
obligations are of still longer duration on average.  See,  for example, 
Estrella  (1984). 
Net Extensions at  Auto Credit 
Billions of  1982  dollars 
120 
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1970  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81  82  83  84  85  86  87  88  89  90 
Source: Federal Reserve  Board. 
Note: Chart  shows nominal net extensions of auto  credit  deflated  by  the  consumer prIce  index  component for  new  cars. 
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20 - increase in Sensitivity occurred  before 1978. Cantor 
concludes that any positive impact that higher interest 
rates might have on consumption because of cash flow 
effects remains a comparatively minor positive offset to 
the more generally restraining effects of interest rates 
on spending. 
The mechanisms  through which market rate  changes 
influence expenditures  on consumer  durables have 
undergone substantial  changes. Traditionally,  banks' 
willingness to extend consumers credit has played a 
significant  role  in the transmission  mechanism. Evi- 
dence presented by John Duca (1987), for example, 
indicates that banks' credit extensions to support con- 
sumer durables expenditures have been related to their 
"willingness to lend," as measured in this case by an 
index derived from the Federal Reserve Senior Loan 
Officer Surveys. The banks' willingness to lend in turn 
has been related  to interest  rate changes, although 
Duca's statistical tests  reveal little direct linkage 
between rates and  consumer outlays once the  inter- 
mediate willingness-to-lend effect is taken into account. 
In recent years, however, the banks' role in financing 
consumer durables expenditures has been firmly chal- 
lenged by the activities of the automobile finance com- 
panies. The share of auto loans made by the finance 
companies has risen significantly in the 1980s 
Chart  4 
(Chart 3). Previously, auto finance rates were lower at 
banks, leaving the higher cost lending of the finance 
companies for the riskier end of the market (Chart 4). 
But now, with both bank and finance company lenders 
competing for business, car buyers may be less likely 
to be constrained in their purchase decisions by funds 
availability or credit qualification limits. In addition, the 
growing issuance of securities backed by auto receiv- 
ables, while  minor compared to mortgage securitiza- 
tion, nonetheless works in  the same direction.  A 
broader implication of the auto financing shifts appears 
to be that, at a given level of market interest rates and 
with the many other factors influencing car sales held 
constant, the effective demand  for autos may  be 
greater than in the past. 
Moreover, the recurrent willingness of auto com- 
panies to subsidize lending by their financing subsid- 
iaries as a means of combating sales slowdowns may 
tend to offset market interest  rate changes to some 
extent. Chart 5 illustrates not only the generally strong 
inverse historical relationships between auto loan rates 
and auto sales, but also the apparent extension of the 
inverse relationship to periods of steep discounting of 
loan rates. If such discounts are systematically used to 
offset weak  sales,  market rate increases may  not 
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This pattern of discounting to offset negative sales 
effects from high market rates would  seem to imply 
that larger market rate increases would  have to be 
associated with given  declines in consumer durables 
outlays.  But  little clear statistical evidence  supports 
this view. For example, the study by Akhtar and Harris 
(1986-87) finds no econometric evidence that the sen- 
sitivity of consumer durables spending to interest rates 
has lessened  in the 1980s, and the results of other 
studies have tended to be mixed at best.15 It is possi- 
ble that episodes of loan  rate discounts  have rein- 
forced an interest rate consciousness among car 
buyers, who have learned to time durables purchases 
to take better advantage of low rates, whether or not 
their longer run demand elasticities have changed. it 
also may be that  — partly as a result of market-based 
loan pricing  — market rates on the whole have become 
15Akhtar and Harris obtained this result after controlling for  effects of 
the 1980 credit controls. If the  auto finance companies' loan pricing 
strategies had lessened the sensitivity of auto buyers to market 
interest rates, this effect should have shown up even after the 1980 
credit  controls episode was accounted for. Friedman  (1989) too finds 
little support for a reduced sensitivity, although Kahn (1989) does 
report a reduction in interest sensitivity in his  consumption equation. 
Chart  5 
better "proxy" measures of the terms, conditions, and 
credit requirements available to car buyers, a develop- 
ment that would boostthe statistical explanatory power 
of the market rates. in addition,  as Bosworth (1989) 
argues, the phasedown of the tax deductibility of con- 
sumer  interest  payments may have raised the sen- 
sitivity  of such expenditures to  rate movements. 
Whatever the reason, to date there appears little solid 
econometric support for the  hypothesis that  sales of 
autos, or consumer durables,  have become any less 
sensitive to market interest rates. 
Formal statistical evidence relating more generally to 
consumption  by the  household sector is scarce,  but 
there is still reason to believe that more available credit 
or  better opportunities to qualify  have increased the 
effective demand for spending at given levels of inter- 
est rates.  Paquette's (1986) study of household debt 
service payments pointed  out that the extension  of 
maturities  on automobile and  other loans was a 
response to the difficulty of meeting income-to-debt 
service requirements during  the high-inflation,  high- 
interest rate period of the early 1980s.  While lending 
policies have at least  partly reverted to more conserva- 
tive shorter maturities as inflation and nominal interest 
6 
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'2 rates have eased in  the later 1980s, certain  of the 
enhanced credit-qualification practices surely have per- 
sisted. Longer run developments  such as the spread of 
credit  cards and the  related growth of computerized 
central credit file vendors appear to be part of a secu- 
lar trend toward improved access to credit by individ- 
uals.  Moreover, banks and other intermediaries  that 
take advantage of the increased credit information can 
more  aggressively  solicit  potential loan  customers 
nationwide. In effect, wider competition allows house- 
holds to choose the lenders doing the most to promote 
funds availability and easy qualification terms. Better 
collateralization of credit, in the form of home equity— 
backed consumer credit lines, represents yet another 
innovation relaxing credit qualification  constraints on 
household spending.16  Partly because this innovation 
was spurred by tax law changes and targeted largely 
toward households with high net worth, it appears to 
have initially supported only modest amounts of net 
new lending,  with low  utilization  of existing  lines.17 
More generally, however,  the comparatively low ratios 
loFor a description of the  market for home equity credit accounts,  see 
Canner,  Fergus,  and Luckeft (1988). 
17See Canner and Luckett (1989). 
Seasonally Adjusted Annual  Rate 
of household  savings to disposable income  in the 
1980s (Chart 6)  and  the  buildup of household  debt 
levels (Chart 7) appear symptomatic of a situation in 
which better funding availability and enhanced credit 
qualification  have  allowed consumer spending to 
remain stronger in the face of high interest rates than 
would have been possible in the absence of the finan- 
cial changes. 
Business expenditures 
Increased funding availability and enhanced ability to 
qualify for credit have been cumulative trends in the 
corporate business sector for  many years. Neverthe- 
less, the number of empirical statistical studies directly 
testing or documenting the effects of such changes on 
business borrowing and  spending behavior has been 
limited. Wojnilower (1980, 1985)  points out many of the 
market and regulatory changes  — often stimulated by 
recurrent funding availability difficulties  — that removed 
obstacles to the smooth  intermediation of funds to 
business  corporations. Hester reviews  several key 
innovations in the 1960s and 1970s that reduced con- 
straints on business borrowing activity, including com- 
mercial banks' development of markets in federal 
funds, negotiable certificates of deposit,  Eurodollars, 
FRBNY Quarterly Review/Summer  1990  17 
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Petcent and repurchase agreements.  These innovations helped 
circumvent  Regulation 0 ceilings,  allowing  funds  to 
continue flowing  as the level of interest  rates rose. 
Brimmer (1989) recounts how the remaining Regulation 
0 ceilings on large deposits were lifted to accommo- 
date smooth commercial bank reintermediation of busi- 
ness commercial paper financings in the wake of the 
Penn Central bankruptcy in June 1970. 
The lessening of constraints on bank intermediation 
to business is reflected also in the changed role of the 
prime  rate,  once  the rate charged the most credit- 
worthy customers. In a 1983 article, Arak,  Englander, 
and Tang provided statistical  evidence that, as banks 
were increasingly forced to offer more competitive pric- 
ing options to large business loan customers, the prime 
rate  itself began to move in a "stickier"  fashion, reflect- 
ing its applicability mainly to less  mobile customers. 
These authors suggested that as the process contin- 
ued and the prime rate became applicable to an even 
smaller set of business borrowers, its pricing would 
become stickier than ever. In fact, by the  mid-1980s, 
even individuals had become eligible for prime-based 
loans in the form of home equity loan pricing.18 This 
11See Canner,  Fergus,  and Luckett (1988) and Canner and Lucketl 
(1989). 
change in the role of the prime rate is indicative of the 
spread of greater lending competition from the highest 
rated corporate customers to the household level. 
After  the middle 1970s, commercial banks' access to 
money market funding sources was relatively free, par- 
ticularly in the absence  of Regulation 0 ceilings on 
large deposits. At the same time, well-known loan cus- 
tomers were themselves increasingly  able to borrow 
directly from the commercial paper market and other 
nonbank sources.19 Moreover, in recent years commer- 
cial banks have also increasingly marketed their contin- 
gency funding  capabilities  in the form of committed 
lines of credit, which often  complement or back up 
business corporations'  open market  borrowings. 
Sofianos, Wachtel, and Melnik (1990) provide some sta- 
tistical support for the assertion that committed bank 
credit lines protect customers from credit rationing; this 
implies that the granting of credit is determined more 
directly by notional credit demands at given interest 
rates. This conclusion in turn can  be interpreted  as 
consistent with the idea that when loan commitments 
are available, the equilibrium level of interest rates will 
be higher than  in their absence,  particularly under 
periods of relatively  tight credit. Morgan (1989) also 
discusses the role of bank loan commitments, partic- 
ularly  their usefulness  when the timing of loan needs is 
uncertain  and default costly, and he too emphasizes 
that commitments  give greater prominence  to high 
interest rates as a means of allocating scarce credit. 
Berger and Udell (1989)  investigate the empirical sig- 
nificance of loan commitments and find, for 1977-88, 
weak evidence of rationing of credit to commercial bor- 
rowers and small effects of loan commitments on the 
amounts of credit extended during periods when 
rationing appeared most likely to occur. 
Hirtle (1990) further analyzes the monetary policy 
consequences  of the growth of bank loan commit- 
ments.  She provides evidence that the growth of com- 
mitments has been  accompanied by a decreased 
responsiveness of output to interest rate movements. 
Hirtle attributes this relationship to a change in the 
composition  of commercial  and  industrial  loan  cus- 
tomers. Large corporate borrowers now tend to rely 
less on bank  borrowings, and for  many companies, 
committed  bank  lines represent only one of several 
competing  sources of funds.  These borrowers  can 
apply to a variety  of banks, the commercial paper mar- 
ket, or other  sources to satisfy their short-term needs 
for funds. Therefore, the productive activities of such 
highly rated  borrowers  are generally well insulated 
from their current financing needs. Thus the statistical 
relationship between economic activity  and the amount 
'°See, for example,  Estrelia (1986). 
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income earned by  households. of bank loans made under commitment is not partic- 
ularly  strong. Conversely, loans not under commitment, 
which presumably tend to go to borrowers more depen- 
dent on their banks, appear to be more closely corre- 
lated with output. 
Although the ability to borrow is essential for many 
businesses to be able to modernize or expand, in the 
1980s the loosening of the link between borrowing and 
spending was manifest in the widespread restructuring 
of corporate  balance  sheets.  The rise  in  corporate 
leverage during the  1980s may have been partly the 
result of expanded  financial  sector capabilities.  Yet 
leverage itself affects a firm's flexibility to borrow more 
under various contingencies. Thus, leverage may affect 
how much a firm's real outlays are influenced by inter- 
est rate changes or other factors  shifting the firm's 
demand for and access to funds. 
The changing relationship between interest rates and 
business activity has been the focus of recent articles 
examining  the potential impact  of rising corporate 
leverage  on cash flow and  on real investment and 
employment decisions. Bernanke and Campbell (1988) 
simulate how interest rate and recession shocks such 
as those of 1973-74 and 1981-82 would have affected a 
large number of corporations if the shocks had 
occurred later in the 1980s. They find that in the con- 
text of 1986 corporate financial structures, significantly 
more corporations  were vulnerable to cash flow 
squeezes or insolvencies than was true earlier. Taken 
alone, however, their results may underestimate the 
extent of potential corporate financing problems. One 
reason is that the Bernanke-Campbell  sample includes 
only companies whose  stock is publicly traded, thus 
excluding the many (in some cases large) firms taken 
private  by LBO transactions.  Another  reason is that 
their statistical results use 1986 data; as Charts 8 and 
9 illustrate, the leveraging trend through the late 1980s 
continued to erode corporate equity and to raise in- 
terest servicing burdens.  More recently,  Bernanke, 
Campbell, and Whited (1990) update the earlier study 
through  1988. Simulating the 1973-74 and  1981-82 
experiences with more recent  financial structures, they 
find that the potential  impact on corporate financial 
conditions appears to have worsened. Moreover, their 
findings also cast doubt on the assertion that the 
leverage increases have been confined to noncyclical 
industries. 
Lee (1990) further investigates the vulnerability  of 
leveraged corporations to economy-wide develop- 
ments. Lee notes that leverage not only results from 
I 
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1980  1981  1982 strategic financing decisions but also can  reflect 
cumulative earnings and  cashflow results. Combining 
firm-specific factors with macroeconomic influences, he 
develops  a statistical model  isolating the induced 
changes in leverage associated with changes in cash- 
flow, inflation, and interest rates  —  as distinct from pur- 
poseful leverage changes  associated with financial 
restructuring strategies. Even after explicitly controlling 
for many of the  microeconomic factors  affecting 
leverage,  Lee finds that the corporate sector has 
indeed become more exposed to macroeconomic 
shocks, as Bernanke and his colleagues found. More- 
over, Lee separates cyclical from noncyclical firms and 
finds  that although the earnings of cyclical firms are by 
definition more vulnerable to business recessions, the 
noncyclical firms can be quite sensitive to inflationary 
cost pressures and accompanying high interest rates. 
Lee  concludes  that the risks are  more  symmetrical 
than  might  have been  supposed,  in  the sense that 
leveraged  businesses  are  potentially  vulnerable  not 
only to recession but also to macroeconomic  overheat- 
ing and increased input cost pressures. 
If the vulnerability  of corporate financial structures 
has risen, what, if anything, does this imply about the 
potential for cutbacks in real investment and employ- 
ment should business finances come under stress? An 
argument can be made that such effects would be lim- 
ited. When a company is having difficulties, or even in 
bankruptcy, it is often in the creditors' and other par- 
ties' collective interests not to disrupt activities gener- 
ating gross revenues net of operating expenses. Thus 
the bankruptcy process itself does not necessarily 
imply extensive layoffs or plant closings. In addition, 
some leveraged firms experiencing debt servicing diffi- 
culties have been able to renegotiate terms, sell 
assets, or exchange debt for equity stakes rather than 
undergo  bankruptcy.  Indeed,  refinancing and asset 
sales capabilities  developed .in conjunction with the 
Chart  9 
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business operations from the effects of financial stress. 
It could also be argued that any inability or unwilling- 
ness of a leveraged firm to pursue profitable invest- 
ment spending opportunities  as they arise would  be 
effectively counterbalanced by the activities of better 
financed competitors, at least to the extent that they 
were positioned to realize the opportunities. 
It may be more realistic, however, to expect that in a 
macroeconomic scenario with  widespread  increased 
interest costs and/or reduced net operating revenues, 
the abilities of firms to refinance bonds or exchange 
equity  for debt would be hampered. Sales of corporate 
assets could also be problematic,  particularly. if 
attempted by many firms at the same time to compen- 
sate for shortfalls in revenues.  Manager-owners  of 
leveraged firms under stress could be expected  to 
reduce discretionary outlays —  implying job losses and 
investment  spending  cutbacks —  to avoid losing corporate 
control  and the• associated possibility  of longer term 
profitability. And given a general environment of uncer- 
tainty, better  financed competitors might not be able or 
willing to pick up the spending slack in the short run. 
Several recent studies suggest that companies expe- 
riencing  financing constraints  are more likely to 
respond to cash flow fluctuations by adjusting their real 
investment  and employment  outlays than are firms 
operating with more financial slack. Fazzari, Hubbard, 
and Petersen (1988)  show that a sample of firms with 
tighter cash flow availability—quantified in terms  of a 
low dividend payout rate—exhibit a closer correlation 
between changes in investment outlays and fluctua- 
tions in cash flow than do firms with better overall cash 
availability. In other  words, when cash  flow is scarce, it 
seems to matter more for investment, at least in the 
short run. Gertler and Hubbard  (1988)  report  similar 
findings,  and Whited  (1990) presents additional  evi- 
dence that U.S. firms with low net financial asset  posi- 
tions are constrained in their real investment spending 
decisions. 
Cantor (1990)  has  extended this broad line  of 
research to focus  specifically on leveraged U.S. corpo- 
rations.  Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen's division of 
firms according to dividend  retention  rates in effect 
identifies  a number of smaller, faster growing  com- 
panies whose ability to invest is tied to their ability to 
generate cash earnings. Cantor's classification accord- 
ing to leverage indicators also results in a cash-con- 
strained subsample, but in this case it includes mature, 
slow-growing  firms that are more typical of participants 
in the 1980s  takeover and buyout activity. Cantor shows 
that the cash flows remaining after debt servicing at 
leveraged firms are proportionally more variable; that 
is, leveraging has not only been occurring at firms with 
unusually stable revenues. Furthermore, he confirms 
that the leveraged firms' investment spending tends to 
fluctuate more in line with cash  flow than is the case at 
less leveraged firms. Finally, Cantor presents some evi- 
dence that employment at leveraged firms is also more 
affected by cash flow availability than is employment  at 
better  capitalized firms. 
Thus the empirical work  appears to confirm the basic 
notion that a more leveraged business,  sector exhibits 
an increased sensitivity of spending to interest  rate 
changes and other  factors, including variations in reve- 
nues.  Higher interest charges may lead cash-con- 
strained firms to cut  back more aggressively on 
investment  and employment.  The implication would 
appear to be that by increasing leverage, corporations 
have become  more, rather than  less,  responsive to 
given changes in interest rates, so that even moderate 
changes in rates may be capable of restraining or stim- 
ulating their expenditures  in the face of economic 
shocks of a given size. A caveat is that, again because 
of leverage, the economic shocks themselves may be 
more severe, in the sense that a given slowdown in 
corporate sales  revenues may more quickly multiply 
into adverse investment and employment decisions. If 
shocks to leveraged firms were to cumulate in such a 
manner, sizable adjustments in interest rates might be 
needed to reestablish equilibrium. Put differently, while 
leveraged firms may indeed be more sensitive to inter- 
est movements, they are correspondingly more sensi- 
tive to other influences as well. So the size of interest 
rate changes  required to offset the effects of other 
shocks may be at least  as large as in the past. 
In sum,  although the reduction of financial con- 
straints has provided more funding options, competitive 
forces have prompted firms to use these enhanced 
capabilities to raise leverage, a step that increases 
firms' vulnerabilities to recession, cost-push inflation, or 
higher borrowing costs. A rise in interest costs, partic- 
ularly if caused by a change in interest rates that is 
unanticipated or oUtside the range contemplated when 
leveraging occurred, would squeeze vulnerable firms' 
cash flows,  investment,  and employment. The basic 
notion that greaterleverage  can create apossibility of 
larger swings  in firm spending  and  macroeconomic 
activity is further developed by Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989). Bernanke pursues a related point in a 1983 arti- 
cle, arguing that the Depression of  the 1930s  was exac- 
erbated  by business failures that disrupted  financial 
intermediation. 
External trade and finance 
Reduced costs of transportation  and communication 
have encouraged a secular increase in the volume of 
international transactions, including trade in real goods 
FRBNY Quarterly Review/Summer  1990  21 and services as well as cross-border financial invest- 
ment and trading. U.S. imports and exports have risen 
relative to total U.S. GNP (Chart 10). Shorter term fluc- 
tuations in  the amount of trade are influenced by 
exchange rates, and thus by U.S.  interest  rates and 
monetary policy. Other factors  equal, a high  level of 
U.S. interest  rates  relative  to foreign interest rates 
attracts capital  inflows, tending to raise the exchange 
value of the dollar, at least in the short run. Thus the 
monetary restraint of higher domestic interest rates on 
domestic demand is supplemented by the restraint of a 
stronger dollar on U.S. net exports. In addition, a 
strong dollar may also have direct disinflationary 
effects on import  prices  and prices of trade-competitive 
goods.2°  As net exports grow secularly as a proportion 
of U.S. total GNP,  these external channels of monetary 
policy transmission increase in importance. 
Moreover,  the propensity of financial capital to flow 
back and forth across borders in response to shifting 
risks  and relative rates of return is now greater, 
because of the reduction of foreign capital  controls, 
improved access to information, the increasingly inter- 
200n the price pass-through  effects of exchange rate changes, see, for 
example,  Hooper and Mann (1989), including their discussion of 
parameter  stability on pp. 320-321. 
national  strategies  of institutional  investors, and the 
success of risk management innovations such as inter- 
est rate swaps and futures, currency futures, and 
longer term currency swaps.21 Chart 11 shows the burst 
of cross-border buying and selling of bonds and equi- 
ties since the mid-1980s. Chart 12 demonstrates that 
with  the  relaxation of capital controls  in  many coun- 
tries, closer arbitrage linkages have emerged between 
domestic short-term interest rates in different curren- 
cies, hedged with forward exchange contracts. Chart 
13 illustrates the rapid growth of the interest rate swap 
market. Combined with currency swaps, the interest 
rate swaps mean that credit risk on a loan or security 
can now be at least  partly "unbundled" from its repric- 
ing and currency risk characteristics. This development 
has given issuers and investors broader access  to 
competitive  international  markets, thereby helping to 
lessen potential constraints on funding availability and 
credit qualification. 
Closer links between financial markets also lead to 
shared sensitivities—sensitivities not only to liquidity 
21The increasing integration of shorter term interest rate and exchange 
markets is discussed in Jeffrey A. Frenkel  (1989). Another recent 
piece by Koh and Levitch (1989) discusses such arbitrage in 
currency futures. 
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economic  factors affecting them  all. One  issue is 
whether the tightening  of linkages creates  so much 
cross-border sensitivity to liquidity conditions that 
national monetary authorities begin to have less influ- 
ence over domestic interest rates and securities prices, 
particularly on longer term instruments. A related ques- 
tion is the extent to which shocks to securities prices, 
from  whatever source,  are  now more readily trans- 
mitted from one market to another. A floating exchange 
rate regime,  such as has been in effect since the 
mid-1970s for the United States and other industrial 
countries,  ensures the long-term independence  of 
national monetary policies and inflation performances. 
On a shorter run basis,  however, a rise in the responsive- 
ness of globally oriented investors to price movements  in 
various national markets could cause securities returns 
to become more mutually sensitive  and interrelated, 
even when denominated in different currencies. 
Studies exploring whether longer  .term securities 
prices or returns are becoming more interrelated 
through time are still somewhat scarce. With regard to 
fixed-income securities, Kasman and Pigott (1988) find 
Chart  11 
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little evidence that during the 1980s long-term interest 
rate fluctuations  in the United States became more 
closely aligned with rate movements in other major 
countries, on a quarterly  average  basis.  Several 
papers, however, have demonstrated statistically  that 
stock price  movements  in  different countries have 
become more correlated in recent years  even aside 
from the highly visible round-the-world "market breaks" 
in October 1987 and  October 1989.  Using  various 
approaches, Friedman and Weiller (1987), Bennett and 
Kelleher (1988), and von Furstenberg and Jeon (1989) 
find increased similarity of price movements in major 
stock market indexes, including higher frequency (that 
is, daily) returns. 
On balance, while  the evidence is  still preliminary, 
globalization has had profound effects on financial mar- 
kets,  although the effects on liquidity and  monetary 
policy are still only partly understood. Credit can now 
be more readily extended across borders, with appro- 
priate hedges  available  for unwanted currency and 
repricing risks that in the past might have discouraged 
movements  of capital even in the absence of regulatory 
controls. In an environment in which domestic access 
to credit by households  and  businesses  has been 
improving, the increased ease with which savings can 
be drawn in from other  countries takes on added signif- 
icance.  While  monetary authorities  can still conduct 
independent policies to the extent that exchange rates 
are allowed to float, tight credit conditions may attract 
capital  inflows from  abroad more readily than in the 
past. Other factors equal, greater competition from for- 
eign lenders and other offshore sources of funds will 
increase the availability of credit to domestic bor- 
rowers, further reducing the odds that credit or funding 
constraints will be binding. In addition, on a short-term 
(for example, daily or weekly)  basis, disturbances to 
stock (and possibly bond) prices appear to be transmit- 
ted across international markets more than in the past, 
a development  which also carries the potential for com- 
plicating the conduct of monetary policy at times. 
Aggregative studies 
Several studies in the past few years have investigated 
whether financial  changes have altered the relation- 
ships between interest rates (and exchange rates) and 
broader macroeconomic  performande.  While some look 
directly at aggregate output, others take a sector-by- 
sector approach, focusing on areas of the economy  tra- 
ditionally sensitive to interest and exchange rates. 
The sector-by-sector studies support the notion that 
the incidence of interest rate effects  has been shifting 
across different parts of the economy. Akhtar and 
Harris (1986-87) examine shifts in interest rate effects 
on real activity, using a set of equations for traditionally 
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consumption, business investment,  and  net exports. 
They conclude that the net effects of interest rate 
changes on the overall economy  have not declined 
through time, although they attribute this result partly 
to their explicitly  controlling  for episodes of funding 
availability problems affecting  housing and consumer 
durables. Friedman  (1989), also using sector equations, 
finds significant changes in the interest sensitivities of 
sectors,  particularly when the reduction of funding 
availability effects on the housing market is included. 
Although  Friedman concludes  that  housing  has 
become less interest sensitive, he finds that business 
investment  has become more sensitive,  leaving it 
unclear whether the aggregate responsiveness of the 
economy to rates has changed. Bosworth (1989) also 
reviews developments in housing, consumption, busi- 
ness investment,  and net exports.  He contends that 
housing  has  become  less  interest  sensitive,  but  he 
points to offsetting increases in sensitivity for  net 
exports and, possibly, consumption. Kahn (1989)  esti- 
mates sector equations  as well, finding decreased 
interest sensitivity in  housing and consumption, 
increased  sensitivity  in net exports,  and little or no 
sensitivity of business investment  to interest rates. 
Thus virtually all the sector-by-sector studies support 
the view that housing has become less interest sensi- 
tive,  mainly  because of deposit deregulation,  and a 
majority find that net  exports  have become a more 
important channel of monetary policy, if only because 
of the rapid growth of traded goods and services. Their 
findings on consumer durables  and  business invest- 
ment,  however, are mixed. With respect to business 
investment, the  hypothesis relating increased interest 
sensitivity to  leverage  may not be  adequately 
addressed by the aggregative studies, since the main 
support for that hypothesis  is  derived  from  studies 
using data on individual firms. More generally, the sec- 
tor-by-sector studies support the notion that the inci- 
dence of monetary restraint has changed, most clearly 
moving away from housing and toward net exports. 
Complicating the question of incidence are the differ- 
ent lengths of time required in the different sectors of 
the economy for interest or exchange rate  changes to 
influence the pace of activity. In principle, financial or 
Chart 13 
Size  of Interest Rate Swap  Market 
Notional  Value of  Outstanding U.S. Dollar  Interest Rate  Swaps 
Billions  of dollars 
Source: International Swap  Dealers  Association. 
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Chart  12 
Dispersion of Covered Short-Term Interest  Rates 
Three-Month  Money Market  Yields  in Dollar  Terms  for  the 
United  States,  Germany, Japan,  Canada, and  the 
United  Kingdom 
Percent 
1uu 
Notes: Chart  shows  mean absolute  deviation of  quarterly 
average short-term yields  (converted to  dollar  terms by  the 
forward exchange rate premia) from  the  simple  average of  the 
five  countries. Yields  used were U.S.  three-month CD rate, 
West  German three-month money  market  rate, Japanese 
three-month Gensaki rate, Canadian ninety-day finance 
company  paper  rate, and British  three-month sterling  interbank 
deposit  rate. 
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OH other changes could alter the length of these lags  in 
particular sectors, but in practice there is not enough 
data to detect or accurately measure  lag changes. 
Whether or not sector lags have been changing, the 
aggregate lag may change if there are sizable differ- 
ences in lags among sectors whose relative weights in 
the monetary transmission process are shifting. A key 
change here is the shift away from domestic interest 
rate impacts and toward the effects of interest rates on 
exchange  rates, net exports, and trade-sensitive prices. 
Although policy lags are intrinsically  difficult to mea- 
sure and possibly inherently uncertain, statistical evi- 
dence tends to show that the lags in the effects of 
interest and exchange rates on net exports are longer 
than lags in the effects of interest rates on domestic 
sectors. The Federal Reserve's macroeconomic model 
of the U.S. economy, for example, shows that a change 
of monetary  policy has its greatest impact on the 
growth rate of GNP within one year.  Bryant, Hoitham, 
and Hooper (1988) review a dozen econometric models 
and find a similar  result, on average.23  In contrast, 
econometric  estimates typically show that the effects of 
a change in the dollar on real net exports require sev- 
eral years to be substantially realized. This long delay 
in  the effects of exchange  rates on  U.S.  real net 
exports is illustrated by the experience of the 1980s: 
the dollar fell sharply in 1985, yet real net exports did 
not significantly outpace imports until  1987, 1988, and 
the first part of 1989. Bryant,  Holtham, and Hooper 
also compare the responses of various econometric 
models to effects of dollar changes on  U.S.  net 
exports; on average, the models they review show a 
lower dollar continuing to have a stimulative impact on 
the U.S. economy for up to four  years.24 
The picture is further complicated because exchange 
rate changes also have direct effects on prices in the 
economies involved, by means of the prices of imports 
and exports. Although the price effects may occur rela- 
tively quickly (in contrast to exchange rate effects on 
real  net  exports),  they are  particularly uncertain  in 
magnitude.25  For example, the proportionate impact of 
dollar movements on the U.S. price level may depend 
on capacity utilization rates, the types of goods and 
See. for  example, Braylon and Mauskopl  (1985),  especially 
pp. 180-81 and Table 4. 
One  of  the comparison simulations run by Bryant,  Holtham,  and 
Hooper on twelve models was to accelerate U.S. money growth by 2 
percent in year one and 4 percent in year two, relative to baseline. 
The average  effect on the level of U.S. real GNP was plus ¾ percent 
in year one and pIus 1 percent in year two, dissipating thereafter 
(see Figure 3-10).  The standard deviation among the twelve models' 
real GNP impacts was about 3/4 percent by year two. 
24See Bryant, Holtham, and Hooper (1988,  Figure  3-20). 
See Hooper and Mann (1989, pp. 320-21). 
services traded, companies' strategies for market 
share, profit levels, and perceptions about the perma- 
nence of exchange rate  changes.2°  As noted earlier, in 
the comparisons of model simulations  performed by 
Bryant, Holtham, and Hooper a "consensus" simulation 
showed that an (exogeneous) appreciation in the dollar 
restrains real U.S. GNP by way of weaker real  net 
exports. Nevertheless,  the dispersion of individual 
model effects around this "consensus" is striking, and 
the degree of price pass-through is one of the main 
sources of divergence.27 
Although the evidence appears to suggest that the 
effects of monetary policy may now occur  with a longer 
and more uncertain lag because of an increase in the 
relative importance of net exports, this conclusion may 
be premature. Because part of the implicit goal of mon- 
etary policy is to achieve objectives within some time 
frame, shifts in the incidence of policy cannot be fully 
evaluated  independently  of the relative timing and 
reliability of effects. The  long lags of the effects of dol- 
lar changes, combined with the uncertainty regarding 
the strength of the effects, might make this  channel 
less  useful for the conduct of policy. If policy were 
attempting to, say, restrain aggregate demand, the 
parts of the economy that react more quickly to policy 
actions might tend to bear  more of the overall restraint. 
Conversely, a sector that is in principle sensitive to 
policy but only with a long lag might turn out to be less 
influenced during the time frame within which policy is 
seeking results. For example, a sector such as housing 
that responds relatively  rapidly to interest  rates has 
become less interest sensitive, while net exports 
appear to have become more sensitive, although only 
with a substantial time lag. In this example, achieving a 
given degree of stimulus or restraint within a  given time 
frame may require wider movements  in rates since this 
objective must be largely realized through the housing 
sector. 
The question then becomes how the longer lagged 
effects on net exports subsequently complicate policy 
and economic performance. One possibility is that the 
lagged effects would provide too much further stimulus 
or restraint after the initial policy effects had already 
occurred, and thereby risk destabilizing the economy. 
This  particular possibility appears somewhat unlikely. 
For example,  one  cause of the apparent lags in 
exchange rate effects on net exports is the existence 
seFor example, see  Froot and Klemperer  (1989) for  a summary of 
recent theories on the pass-through  from exchange rates to import 
prices; the authors present some evidence that market share 
considerations  and expected future exchange  rate  changes may 
have important effects on the degree of pass-lhrough. 
See Bryant, Holtham,  and Hooper (1988); also see Brayton  and 
Mauskopl (1985), especially Table 4 and pp. 181-82. 
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equipment).  A new exchange rate  would have to persist 
at least  over the remaining life of a contract to have an 
effect on the value and volume of trade when the con- 
tract  finally  comes up for renewal. But if the initial mon- 
etary policy impacts  have already worked their way 
though the economy, then by the time of renewal the 
interest and exchange rates would already have read- 
justed as well, with little effect on the subsequent con- 
tracts. Similarly, if businesses have long-term import  or 
export  strategies (for market share and so forth), then 
they may resist  altering pricing  or sales goals when 
exchange rate swings are  recognized as temporary. 
This may blunt the exchange rate effects not only on 
net exports but also on the degree  of price pass- 
through.  More  generally, except in special (hard-to- 
identify)  cases when activity in the future is strongly 
affected, not by future exchange rates or by average 
exchange rates over the intervening horizon but specif- 
ically by exchange rate values today, the likelihood of 
destabilizing delayed  effects via lagged  exchanged 
rates appears  minor. It follows that the influence  of 
interest  rate movements or monetary policy changes 
will fall on traditionally sensitive domestic sectors, and 
the net effect may be a decline in the overall interest 
sensitivity of aggregate demand rather than merely a 
shift in its incidence across sectors. 
Indeed,  two recent studies have  examined  more 
directly whether overall GNP—rather  than particular 
industries or sectors  —  has changed in its responsive- 
ness to interest rate changes. Kahn (1989)  economet- 
rically compares the effects of changes in the federal 
funds rate on real GNP in two subperiods, 1955-79 and 
1983-89 (skipping the early 1980s).  He finds that the 
effect on real GNP growth of a 1 percent change in the 
interest rate was  substantially larger in the earlier 
period. More recently, Hirtle and Kelleher (1990) also 
test for changes in the impact of interest rates on GNP 
but, rather than break the sample into two parts, they 
allow a time path for the interest rate coefficient. Not- 
withstanding the different specification, they find a 
decline in  interest sensitivity qualitatively  similar to 
•Kahn's result.28  Interestingly, however,  Hirtle and 
Kelleher calculate that interest sensitivity declines  in 
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and then levels off or 
28Akhtar (1983) also reports, in the context of a  single equation model, 
a statistically significant decline after 1977 in interest sensitivity for 
U.S. and Italian aggregate spending, while for other major economies 
he finds  a rise in sensitivity during that period. Like Hirtle and 
Kelleher,  Akhtar finds that allowing for the parameter shift raises his 
overall interest elasticity estimate values. Akhtar and Dennis (1984) 
report qualitatively similar post-1977  declines in interest sensitivity for 
the United States,  Canada, and  Italy, but they report increases in 
sensitivity in Japan, Germany,  France, and the United Kingdom in the 
corresponding time period. 
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even increases moderately again in the 1980s. Taken at 
face value, this finding would suggest that some of the 
more significant structural  changes actually occurred 
much earlier, for example, with the interbank funding 
developments  discussed by Hester (1981). The elimina- 
tion of retail deposit interest ceilings and the growth of 
secondary mortgage markets and other sources of 
funding flexibility for thrift institutions during the 1970s 
and 1980s would then appear to have had analogous 
effects on the sensitivity  of the economy to interest 
rate changes. Although the more recent financial mar- 
ket developments in the 1980s have further  reduced 
the constraints  on funding  availability and the credit 
qualification process, it is possible that they have been 
quantitatively less significant than the changes in ear- 
lier decades and, particularly in the latter 1980s, offset 
by the increase in leverage-related  sensitivities. 
Conclusions 
Relationships  between  interest  rates and  economic 
activities are of central importance to the transmission 
of monetary policy. There is little basis, however, for 
presuming that  these relationships are static or 
unchanging. On the contrary, a variety of institutional 
developments  and statistical findings confirm the notion 
that the ways monetary policy and interest rates affect 
the economy have been evolving. Several factors have 
contributed to this evolution: changes in structure and 
competition in financial services industries; regulatory 
changes; advances in communications, data process- 
ing, and information management  technology; the geo- 
graphic enlargement of markets;  and the rapid 
development  of new financial instruments  or tech- 
niques. Financial changes  have made  credit  more 
widely and  competitively available,  reducing inter- 
mediation costs and eliminating or reducing constraints 
on funding  availability and credit qualification.  This 
development in principle should raise the equilibrium 
level of interest  rates and may help account for the 
erratic upward movement of nominal and real rates dur- 
ing the past several decades. 
The  removal of constraints on funding availability and 
credit qualification also  may alter the degree of real 
stimulus or restraint associated  with rate changes. 
There is some limited statistical  support for the view 
that the interest elasticity of aggregate demand has 
fallen during the past several decades. More recently, 
however, leveraging of some businesses and the rise in 
borrowing by some households may have had an off- 
setting effect, replacing traditional constraints on bor- 
rowing at the margin with new leverage-related credit 
qualification  and  cash flow  constraints. The rise  in 
leverage should make some components of aggregate 
spending more, rather than less, sensitive to interest rate movements. In theory such a development might 
reduce the size of movements  in interest rates required 
to stabilize spending by leveraged firms and  house- 
holds, barring scenarios in which the leveraging mag- 
nifies the force of inflationary or recessionary 
influences that monetary policy seeks to counteract. In 
addition,  the growth  of international  goods and ser- 
vices suggests a greater  external channel for monetary 
policy, through the effects of exchange rates on output 
and prices. A practical limitation on this channel, how- 
ever, is the long and uncertain lag with which it tends 
to operate. Finally, the international integration of capi- 
tal  markets  not only accentuates  the elimination  of 
domestic constraints on funding availability and credit 
qualification but also implies greater mutual sensitivity 
and shared liquidity conditions across national markets. 
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